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ARTICLE

The Role of Insurance in Providing Adequate
Compensation and in Reducing Pollution
Incidents: the Case of the International Oil
Pollution Liability Regime
MUHAMMAD MASUM BILLAH*
In terms of compensation, the international oil pollution
liability regime1 is very successful, but its success in deterring
negligent navigation is not above question. That said, the stated
primary goal of the oil pollution liability regime is to provide
adequate compensation against oil pollution damage.2
In

*
Muhammad Masum Billah, Assistant Professor, Sultan Qaboos
University, Oman, LL.D (University of Ottawa), LL.M (University of Alberta),
LL.B (Int. Islamic University Malaysia).
1. The international oil pollution compensation regime consists of two
international conventions: (1) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); and (2) International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 16 I.L.M 621 (1972). This article discusses
the conventions as amended in 1992, see INT’L CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1992, reprinted in INT’L OIL COMPENSATION FUNDS,
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992
CONVENTIONS AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 7-19 (2005), available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf [hereinafter CLC]; see
INT’L CONVENTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INT’L FUND FOR COMPENSATION
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1992, reprinted in INT’L OIL COMPENSATION FUNDS,
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992
CONVENTIONS AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 25-48 (2005), available
at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/ Conventions%20English.pdf [hereinafter Fund
Convention].
2. This goal is explicitly stated in the preambles to both the CLC and the
Fund Convention: “The State Parties to the present Convention . . . [are]
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available . . .”
CLC, supra note 1, at 7 (emphasis added); Fund Convention, supra note 1, at 27
(emphasis added).
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fulfilling this goal, the oil pollution liability regime has achieved
great success.3 The success of the oil pollution liability regime in
guaranteeing adequate compensation can be attributed to its
various insurance provisions. It not only imposes compulsory
insurance on ship-owners but also requires them to carry a
certificate of insurance as proof. The regime then ensures oil
pollution victims access to insurance proceeds by allowing them
to bring direct action against the insurers.
To further guarantee adequate compensation, it creates
various compensation funds, contributed mainly by the oil
industry. Under the international liability regime, there are two
such funds: the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
(IOPC) and the Supplementary Fund. Additional funds exist in
North America: in Canada, the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund
(SOPF)4 covers oil pollution damage not recoverable under the
international regime; and in the United States, the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)5 provides compensation above and
beyond ship-owners’ liability under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA).6 These funds function as an additional tier of insurance
against oil pollution damage.
3. The problem with compensation as the primary goal is that it ignores the
possible effect of law on the behavior of liable parties in reducing pollution
incidents. Consequently, the primary focus of the states’ representatives during
the negotiation of the CLC and the Fund Convention was on who should pay for
oil pollution damage instead of who could be induced through liability to reduce
the damage. See R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION,
POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 183-90 (1981) (providing for
an excellent account of the negotiation).
4. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6, s. 91-93 (Can.). Canada ratified the
conventions on April 24, 1989. See Suzanne Hawkes & R. Michael M’Gonigle, A
Black (and Rising?) Tide: Controlling Maritime Oil Pollution in Canada, 30
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 165, 226-27 (1992). Canada cast the sole negative vote
against the adoption of the CLC in 1969, objecting to its limited liability and
narrow geographical scope of application. Its application was limited at that
time to territorial water, although the 1992 Protocol extended its application to
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). See M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at
176.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006). The U.S. is not a party to the international oil
pollution liability regime. It has its own oil pollution liability regime, contained
in the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006) [hereinafter OPA].
Although the OPA is similar in structure to the international liability regime,
the OPA’s scope is wider than that of the international regime.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761.
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Though intended mainly to provide adequate compensation,
these insurance provisions also incidentally lead to improved
deterrence. This is because insurance premiums needed for the
above-mentioned insurance arrangements will roughly reflect the
compensation paid to oil pollution victims; higher compensation
will entail higher premiums. Higher premiums will in turn
induce insured ship-owners and the oil industry towards a
heightened standard of care so that they pay less in premium.
This incidental effect of insurance arrangements explains at least
partly why incidents of oil pollution are on the decline.7
The main focus of this article is to prove how the above
insurance arrangements under the oil pollution liability regime
have made it a very effective liability regime both in terms of
compensation and deterrence (the effect of deterrence being the
reduction of oil pollution incidents). As these two concepts would
be repeated throughout the article, brief discussion of their
relative weight as goals of liability law may not be out of place
here. Although both compensation and deterrence are legitimate
goals of liability law,8 the latter is the more important goal
between the two. In fact, under economic analysis of liability law,
which is used quite extensively in this article, deterrence is the
primary goal of liability law due to its effect on the reduction of
future incidents of liability.9 Fewer incidents will lower social
loss and thus will improve total social welfare/utility. On the
other hand, compensation transfers money from one party to
another without any change in the total social welfare.
Of course, when compensation is paid by a party at fault, as
is the case in most situations of liability, that party is also
deterred from similar acts or omissions in the future. However,
the goal of adequate compensation can also be achieved without
any improvement on deterrence.
This may happen when
compensation comes from a source/party not liable for an incident

7. See Statistics, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N,
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/
index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
8. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.
W. ONT. L. REV. 111, 111 (1978-79).
9. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230-32,
267-69, 635-38 (2004).
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(e.g., various funds under oil pollution liability regimes; they are
funded by oil companies and not by liable ship-owners) or when
insurance covers the loss suffered by the insured, though caused
by a third party.10
After a brief outline of the international oil pollution liability
regime in Part I, Part II analyzes the success of the liability
regime in providing adequate compensation through its various
innovative insurance arrangements. Where relevant, the article
will also compare similar insurance arrangements in other
maritime liability laws. Part III briefly examines the connection
between the above-mentioned insurance arrangements and the
reduction of oil pollution incidents worldwide.
I.

OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY REGIME IN SHORT

Prior to 1969, there was no special liability law for oil
pollution damage.11 Historically, oil pollution liability was not a
distinct heading of ship-owners’ liability.
Parties suffering
damage due to oil spills could claim compensation under the
common law principles of negligence, trespass, nuisance, and
strict liability.12 Ship-owners could limit their liability under the
general maritime liability law.13 In the aftermath of the Torrey
10. See Muhammad Masum Billah, Economic Analysis of Limitation of
Shipowners’ Liability, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 297, 300-301 (2007).
11. See ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 288 (2006).
12. See e.g., Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 414
(Q.B.D.) (Eng.), appeal denied [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 446 (A.C.) (Eng.), rev’d
[1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655 (H.L.) (Eng.); The Wagon Mound, [1961] A.C. 388
(P.C.) (appeal taken from New South Wales); Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co.,
267 F. 460 (D.R.I. 1920); Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp.
225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), rev’d on other grounds sub. nom. Salaky v. Atlas Barge No.
3, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953); In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973). The
American cases are cited and discussed in Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability,
Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L. J. 481, 490-502 (2000).
13. In international maritime settings, ship-owners’ general liability law was
at that time contained in the International Convention Relating to the
Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, Oct. 10, 1957, 52
U.K.T.S. (1958), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/treaties/
TS1/1968/52. The liability was fault-based and the limit was calculated on the
basis of 1,000 gold francs (US$67) per ton for property damage and 2,000 francs
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Canyon incident in 1967, the international community realized
the inadequacy of general maritime law in covering the expenses
The international
of devastating oil pollution damage.14
community adopted a specific liability regime to address the
problem of inadequate compensation for oil pollution. This
regime now comprises the CLC and the Fund Convention.15 The
CLC deals with ship-owners’ liability, which is strict but limited
in amount, while the Fund Convention created the IOPC Fund to
provide for oil pollution damage when compensation from shipowners is either inadequate or unavailable. That said, the Fund’s
compensation is limited as well, albeit at a higher ceiling.
The combined maximum limit of compensation under the
CLC and the Fund Convention is SDR16 203 million
(approximately US$320 million).17 In 2003, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a new Protocol to the Fund
Convention to create a Supplementary Fund, a third tier of
compensation with a SDR750 million (approximately US$1.18
billion) ceiling. The ceiling applies to the total compensation
available from the IOPC Fund and the Supplementary Fund
combined per oil pollution incident.18 The Protocol came into
per ton for personal injury and death claim. Unlike the CLC, the 1957
Convention did not have any maximum ceiling for total liability.
14. Clean-up alone costs the British and French governments £7.70 million
(US$18 million). Although it was impossible to estimate the damage to the
environment, the total quantifiable cost was £14.24 million. See Paul Burrows,
Charles Rowley & David Owen, The Economics of Accidental Oil Pollution by
Tankers in Coastal Waters, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 258 (1974). Ultimately, the U.K. and
France settled for slightly over US $7 million. M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note
3, at 153.
15. See M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 196.
16. Special Drawing Right (SDR) is the monetary unit of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). As of October 12, 2011, SDR 1 is the equivalent of US
$1.57526. See SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
17. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1; Fund Convention, supra note 1,
at art. 4, para. 4. Under the CLC, the calculation is based on the tonnage of
ships and ship-owners’ maximum liability is SDR89.77 million. However, for
ships with 5,000 gross register tons (grt) or less, the limit is SDR4.51 million.
Any ship above 5,000 grt may incur additional liability of SDR631 per ton, but
the total cannot exceed SDR89.77 million. It is noteworthy that one grt is
equivalent to 100 cubic feet of enclosed space in a ship.
18. Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, art. 2,
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force on March 3, 2005.19 It is now very unlikely that liability for
oil pollution damage from any one incident will exceed the
Supplementary Fund’s limit. The U.S. is not a party to any of
these international conventions. Canada is party to both the CLC
and the Fund Convention,20 including its 2003 Protocol,21 and
implements the law through its Marine Liability Act.22
The U.S. played a leading role during the negotiation of the
CLC and the Fund Convention and the 1984 Protocols to these
conventions23 but did not ratify them, objecting to their
inadequate liability limit and preemption of U.S. state laws.24
Until 1990, the U.S. enacted numerous federal acts to deal with
both general and specific geographic oil pollution damage.25 The
para. 4, May 16, 2003, Int’l Mar. Org., LEG/CONF.14/20, available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/
Supp_Fund_e.pdf [hereinafter Supplementary Fund Protocol].
19. See Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated Sep. 30,
2011).
20. See About the IOPC Funds, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http://
www.iopcfund.org/92members.htm (last updated Oct. 1, 2011). As of October 1,
2011, there were 105 contracting states to both the Fund Convention and the
CLC, as amended by the 1992 Protocols. Id. Nineteen states are parties to the
CLC but not to the Fund Convention. Id. There are another 37 states, which are
parties to the CLC in its original 1969 version. About the IOPC Funds, INT’L OIL
POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http://www.iopcfund.org/69civilliability.htm (last
updated Oct. 1, 2011).
21. As of October 6, 2011, there were twenty-seven state parties to the
Supplementary Fund; most of the states are from the European Union. About
the IOPC Funds, supra note 20.
22. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6 (Can.).
23. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 613, 613-23 (1984);
Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 15 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 623, 623-33 (1984). These protocols never came into force due to the
U.S.’s non-ratification and were reintroduced through the 1992 protocols with
modification in the entry-into-force requirement.
24. Edgar Gold, Marine Pollution Liability After “Exxon Valdez”: The U.S.
“All-Or-Nothing Lottery!”, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 423, 432-33 (1991). See also TAN,
supra note 11, at 318-19.
25. Cf. Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] § 311, 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (liability for discharge of oil or hazardous substance into
any navigable waters); Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 2, 33 U.S.C § 1501 (2006)
(regulating oil pollution in deep-water ports); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
§ 2, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (controlling oil pollution in outer-continental shelf);
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need for a comprehensive oil pollution liability regime had long
been felt and Congress debated the issue for over fifteen years.
The Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989, the largest oil pollution
disaster in U.S. history26 up until the recent incident of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill,27 brought an abrupt end to the
congressional debate, and Congress quickly enacted the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA) in reaction to the incident. Although more
than 150 bills on various aspects of oil spill incidents were
presented to Congress after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, none
have yet become law.28

43 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (regulating oil pollution from Trans-Alaska pipeline).
See also Akintayo A. Ayorinde, Inconsistencies Between OPA ’90 and MARPOL
73/78: What is the Effect on Legal Rights and Obligations of the United States
and Other Parties to MARPOL 73/78?, 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. 55, 69-70 (1994);
Kiern, supra note 12, at 505-07.
26. A total of 37,000 tons of crude oil spilled into the pristine water of Prince
William Sound, Alaska. Although it is the second largest oil spill in the United
States, it ranks only thirty-fifth in major oil spills worldwide. See Statistics,
INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, http://www.itopf.com/informationservices/data-and-statistics/statistics/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). Its
total economic cost was estimated to exceed $12 billion. See Kiern, supra note
12, at 481-82.
27. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is the largest oil
spill incident not only in the United States but also in the world. An estimated
4.9 million barrels (over 671,000 tons; 7.3 barrels = 1 ton) of crude oil escaped
from the leaked well from April 20 to mid-July, 2010, when it was finally
capped. See Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of
Civil Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011). Technically, it may not be vesselsource oil pollution because almost all the oil spilled from the leaked well.
However, some of the oil may have spilled from the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile
offshore drilling unit (MODU). The unit may be termed as a “vessel” under the
OPA because the Act defines vessel very broadly to include any “watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006) (emphasis added). Although
the structure was attached to the seabed at the time of explosion, it was capable
of transporting the drilling equipment on navigable water. In addition, the
structure and the well together would be an “offshore facility” and such a facility
is subject to the OPA. The OPA defines an “offshore facility” as “any facility of
any kind located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the United
States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a
vessel or a public vessel.” Id.; see also Vincent J. Foley, Post-Deepwater Horizon:
The Changing Landscape of Liability for Oil Pollution in the United States, 74
ALB. L. REV. 515, 520-21 (2011).
28. See Marcus Baram, Nil, Baby, Nil: Congress Fails to Pass a Single Oil
Spill
Law,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
19,
2011,
7:19
PM),
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The scope of the OPA is broader than the international
regime in terms of vessel types29 and polluting oil.30 Ship-owners’
liability under the Act is also higher than their liability under the
CLC, especially for larger ships.31 The right to limit liability can
also be denied more easily under the OPA than under the CLC.
Unlike the international regime, there is no maximum ceiling on
ship-owners’ liability under the OPA other than the per ton
limit;32 liability increases in proportion to the increased tonnage
and can never be less than US$3,000 per ton for single-hull
tankers or US$1,900 per ton for double-hull tankers.33 In
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/19/nil-baby-nil-congress-fai_n
851274.html.
29. “Vessel” is defined in the OPA to include “every description of watercraft
or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water, other than a public vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(37)
(emphasis added). On the other hand, in the CLC and the Fund Convention,
vessel is defined to include only oil tankers and other ships which are adapted to
carry oil and are actually carrying oil. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 1;
Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 2 (adopting the same definition
by cross-reference to the CLC). As discussed in the previous note, the Deepwater
Horizon unit would be considered a vessel under the OPA but not under the
international oil pollution regime because the mobile drilling unit was neither
an oil tanker nor a ship “adapted to carry oil.”
30. While the international regime covers only pollution from “persistent oil”
such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oil, CLC, supra note
1, at art. I, para. 5, the OPA includes pollution damage occurring both from
persistent and non-persistent oil. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23). The OPA also includes
non-petroleum oil such as vegetable oil and animal fat. See Kiern, supra note 12,
at 509.
31. This is because per ton liability for oil pollution from a tanker cannot be
less than US$3,000 for a single-hull tanker or US$1,900 for double-hull tankers.
Under the original OPA, per ton liability could not be less than US$1,200 for
any kind of tanker. See Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-241, 120 Stat. 516 (2006). The Act increased the liability limit
provided in the OPA. On the other hand, under the CLC, liability could be as
low as SDR450 for a large tanker of 200,000 tons because the maximum liability
for a tanker owner under the CLC cannot be more than SDR89,777,000. See
CLC, supra note 1, at art. V, para. 1(b).
32. See WU CHAO, POLLUTION FROM THE CARRIAGE OF OIL BY SEA: LIABILITY
AND COMPENSATION 241 (1996).
33. See supra text accompanying note 31. The concept of a maximum ceiling
on liability was something new for maritime liability law at that time. Such a
ceiling did not exist in the then-existing general liability law, the 1957
Convention and its predecessor the 1924 Convention. See International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of
Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Aug. 24, 1924, 2763 L.N.T.S. 123. It even did not
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addition to ship-owners’ liability, the federal government created
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is authorized
to spend up to US$1 billion for any single oil pollution incident.34
II. ADEQUATE COMPENSATION THROUGH
VARIOUS INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
Oil pollution liability regimes under both the international
system and the U.S. domestic laws have proven to provide
adequate compensation in most of the actual oil pollution cases.
Since the adoption of the OPA, no oil pollution incident in the
U.S. has exceeded the combined limit of ship-owner’s liability and
that of the OSLTF.35 Although oil pollution damage in some of
the incidents falling under the CLC and Fund Convention did
exceed their earlier combined limit,36 it is highly unlikely that
damage from any future incident will do so especially in a country
which is party to the Supplementary Fund Protocol.
The success of oil pollution liability regimes in providing
adequate compensation can be attributed to their various
appear in the IMO’s Legal Committee’s draft. It was proposed in the 1969 IMO
conference by the UK delegation and the proposal was probably inspired from a
similar measure in the tanker-owners’ private agreement, TOVALOP, designed
to provide for governments’ cleanup costs due to oil pollution. See Tanker
Owners’ Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution [TOVALOP], 8
I.L.M. 497 (1969). See also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 158-59, 173.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006).
35. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-1163T, MARITIME
TRANSPORTATION: MAJOR OIL SPILLS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY, BUT RISKS TO THE
FEDERAL OIL SPILL FUND REMAIN 28 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO-07-1085. However, GAO now fears that claims to the OSLTF
fund following the incident of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill may well exceed
the US$1 billion limit. This limit applies to all the money paid from the OSLTF
even though some of the payments are later reimbursed by the responsible
parties under the OPA. Therefore, GAO recommended that Congress amend the
provisions of the OPA to calculate the limit of $1 billion based on net
expenditures (i.e., expenditures after deducting the reimbursed amount from
responsible parties). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-397R,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: UPDATE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISKS AND
CLAIMS PROCESSING 14, 16-19, 30 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11397r.pdf.
36. Among these incidents are the Amoco Cadiz in France (1978), the Erika
again in France (1999), the Prestige in Spain (2002), and the Hebei Spirit in
South Korea (2007). For descriptions, see Incidents, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP.
FUNDS, http://www.iopcfund.org (last updated Jul. 11, 2011).
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insurance arrangements as well as the higher limit on shipowners’ liability. The word “insurance” is used in this article in
its wider sense—that is, any guaranteed source of compensation
for victims of oil pollution damage. Thus, not only does shipowners’ actual insurance come within the term but the
compensation from the IOPC Fund, the Supplementary Fund, the
SOPF, and the OSLTF also fall under the term since the common
goal of these funds is to provide for adequate compensation
against oil pollution damage. These funds collect contributions or
premiums from the companies which receive oil transported by
sea, while ship-owners pay the premium for their liability
insurance against oil pollution liability. The following is an
analysis of how various insurance arrangements in the
international oil pollution liability regime led to its success in
providing adequate compensation for oil pollution damage.
A. Compulsory Insurance
The most important provision in the oil pollution liability
regime in regard to adequate compensation is the provision of
compulsory insurance up to the maximum liability limit of a shipowner under the CLC.37 The concept of compulsory insurance
was quite revolutionary in maritime law at the time of the
adoption of the CLC, although it was not without precedent.38
37. Under the CLC, owners of tankers over 2,000 grt are required to carry
insurance. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 1. In comparison, under the
OPA, insurance is compulsory on any ship over 300 grt. 26 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(2)
(2006). Although the provisions give ship-owners the option to have other
financial security or guarantees instead of insurance, they all function like
insurance in terms of their effect—guaranteed compensation against oil
pollution damage. Consequently, this article treats them all as insurance in
their functional sense. Proceeds from these insurance mechanisms are
exclusively available for oil pollution compensation. See CLC, supra note 1, at
art. VII, para. 9.
38. The concept of compulsory insurance existed in the 1962 Convention on
the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships. See Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Nuclear Ships, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 268-278 (1963) (text of
convention). As can be seen from the name of the convention, the ships on which
compulsory insurance was imposed were not ordinary merchant ships. See
Alfred Popp, The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, in THE CIVIL
LIABILITY AND FUND CONVENTIONS: MODEL COMPENSATION SCHEMES 81, 82 (2003);
see also, Erik Røsæg, Compulsory Maritime Insurance, 2000 SCANDINAVIAN INST.
OF MAR. & PETROLEUM L.Y.B. (2000).
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Before the oil pollution liability regime took effect, compulsory
insurance had been in existence for quite some time in some nonmaritime liability laws such as laws on automobile accident and
workmen compensation. The usual explanation of compulsory
insurance is that it secures the provision of adequate
compensation against certain unforeseeable accidents.39
The provision of compulsory insurance is the key element for
the continuous success of oil pollution liability regimes. Without
compulsory insurance, the imposition of liability, no matter how
high the liability limit, may prove useless due to the ability of a
ship-owning company to hide behind its “corporate veil.”40
Together with the provision of direct action against the insurer,
compulsory
insurance
guarantees
the
availability
of
compensation up to the required insurance amount regardless of
a corporation’s ability to shelter its assets.
Compulsory insurance forces potentially liable parties to buy
insurance up to the required limit. These potentially liable
parties may otherwise decide not to buy insurance because their
total assets would be less than their maximum liability.41
Empirical studies in automobile insurance have borne out this
observation. Those studies showed that the number of uninsured
motorists can be as high as 20 percent in states with no

39. Although compulsory insurance is mainly thought of as providing
protection for the victims of accidents, it also protects the injurer at the same
time from the ruinous effect of high liability. See Richardson v. Pitt-Stanley,
[1995] QB 123 (Eng.). In Richardson, Stuart-Smith L.J. rationalized the
provision of compulsory workmen compensation insurance as a protection for
employers by saying that “a small or even medium-sized employer may be faced
with disastrous consequences for his business . . . if he is faced with a large
claim by an injured workman, which will make large inroads into his resources.”
Id. at 131. In the same case, the dissenting justice, Sir John Megaw, opined
that the insurance was made compulsory for the “protection to a particular class
of individuals, the employees.” Id. (Sir John Megaw, dissenting). See also Janet
O’Sullivan, Industrial Injuries and Compulsory Insurance: Adding Insult to
Injury, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 227, 242-43 (1995).
40. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006); see also infra text accompanying note 47.
41. Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability
Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 166 (1990); see also GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 58-59
(1970).
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compulsory insurance as compared to one percent in states with
compulsory insurance.42
Although it may be a rare incident when the liability of a
shipping company would exceed its real assets, the company may
artificially keep its assets low through forming corporate
subsidiaries. A ship-owning company can, and usually does, form
a separate corporation for each ship in its fleet. This has the
practical effect of limiting liability to the value of the ship,43
which may be zero in cases of accidents where the ship is a total
loss.44 The practice of forming one-ship companies is widespread
in the shipping industry,45 with the practical consequence of this
being that the liability of the corporation may be limited to the
“congeries of wooden planks or pieces of iron.”46 This is exactly
what would have happened in the case of the Torrey Canyon
incident had the liability not been ultimately settled.47

42. Gary T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured
Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 421-22 (1987); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects
of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving,
38 J. L. & ECON. 49, 54 (1995).
43. Even though a ship’s liability is calculated on the basis of its tonnage
under general maritime law today, in the absence of compulsory insurance the
only asset a plaintiff can get a hold on may be the damaged ship.
44. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 2010, the mobile
offshore drilling unit completely sank after burning for three days. Transocean
Ltd., the company owning the unit, filed for limitation of liability petition. See
46 U.S.C. § 30505. The limit of a ship-owner’s liability is the value of the vessel
after the incident and the pending freight. The company sought to limit its
liability to its pending freight (US$26.7 million) from the lessee of the unit, an
affiliate of British Petroleum (BP). Even if Transocean succeeds in its petition,
the limit under the Limitation of Liability Act would not apply to the claims
falling under the OPA. Only the non-OPA claims such as personal injury would
be limited. See Foley, supra note 27, at 528-29.
45. See TAN, supra note 11, at 34.
46. Lord Watson in Sailing Ship “Blairmore” Co. Ltd. v. Macredie [1898] A.C.
593, 603 (H.L.).
47. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006) (liability is based on the value of the ship
and pending freight after the incident). The liability of the ship-owner was held
by a U.S. district court to be US$50, the value of the single salvaged lifeboat. See
also In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969); Kiern, supra note 12, at 503. The
corporate structure of the Torrey Canyon also illustrates the concept of hiding
behind the “corporate veil” in its extreme. There, the ship was registered in
Liberia and owned by a Bermudian company, the Barracuda Tanker
Corporation, which was a corporate subsidiary of the Union Oil, an American
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The goal of adequate compensation requires that all ships
carry insurance regardless of whether the flag state of a ship is
party to the international oil pollution liability regime. To achieve
this goal, the CLC imposes an obligation on state parties to
ensure that both local ships48 and foreign ships above 2,000 grt
carry insurance before entering ports or off-shore terminals of a
contracting state.49
This requirement neutralizes any
competitive advantage that a ship from a non-contracting state
may have over ships from contracting states. The provision is
quite innovative in the sense that it forces ships from noncontracting states to purchase compulsory insurance if they wish
to trade in a contracting state to the CLC.
Traditionally, a ship is obliged to follow the law of its flag
state; coastal and port states cannot usually impose their laws on
a foreign vessel.50 The principle of flag state supremacy over port
or coastal states gives ships of a state with less stringent
maritime laws some competitive advantage over ships from states
with stricter laws.51 For example, in the absence of the above
provision, a state might decide not to become a party to the CLC
so that the ships from that state do not incur the cost of
compulsory insurance, thereby gaining a competitive advantage
over ships from states that are party to the CLC. The obligation
to carry compulsory insurance under the CLC removes the
incentive for ship-owners to register their ships in so-called “flags
of convenience” in an attempt to avoid the cost of insurance. In
other words, when it comes to compulsory insurance for oil
pollution liability, these ships cannot avoid purchasing such
insurance by hiding behind a flag state not party to the CLC.52
company. The ship was then bareboat-chartered to the Union Oil, which in turn
voyage-chartered it to the British Petroleum, a UK company. See M’GONIGLE &
ZACHER, supra note 3, at 149-50; TAN, supra note 11, at 288-89.
48. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 10.
49. Id. at art. VII, para. 11.
50. See RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 76 (1994).
51. See TAN, supra note 11, at 23-25, 34-35, 47-67; see also William Tetley,
The Law of the Flag, ‘Flag Shopping’ and the Choice of Law, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J.
175 (1992); Richard Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to
National Security, 3 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 67 (1980).
52. See Hawkes & M’Gonigle, supra note 4, at 224; M’GONIGLE & ZACHER,
supra note 3, at 226, 67, 236; TAN, supra note 11, at 181-82.
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The success of the international oil pollution liability regime
in providing adequate and secured compensation inspired the
international community and the IMO to adopt similar insurance
arrangements in other maritime liability law conventions. For
example, the convention on compensation for passengers’
personal injury or death as well as for personal property damage
and loss,53 the conventions on compensation for loss or damage
from hazardous and noxious substance (HNS) and from bunker
oil54 pollution (Bunker Convention), all now have provisions for
compulsory insurance.55 In fact, there were attempts to include
similar provisions covering all areas of maritime liability law via
amendment of the 1976 Liability Convention during the
negotiation of its 1996 Protocol.56
Although the 1976 Liability Convention and its
predecessors57 do not provide for compulsory insurance, a shipowner may still be required to carry insurance up to the liability
limits of these conventions when the Bunker Convention applies
to the ship. This is because the Bunker Convention imposes
compulsory insurance for oil pollution from bunkers of non-

53. INT’L MAR. ORG, PROTOCOL OF 2002 TO THE ATHENS CONVENTION RELATING
CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS AND THEIR LUGGAGE BY SEA, 1974, art. 3 (2002),
available at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/dipcon/20.pdf [hereinafter
2002 Athens Convention].
54. Bunker oil is fuel oil for a ship as opposed to the oil the ship is carrying.
Pollution from such oil is not covered by CLC and Fund Conventions unless it is
from an oil-carrying ship. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 5 (providing the
definition of “oil”).
55. International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substance by Sea
(HNS) art. 7, May 3, 1996, U.N.T.S. [hereinafter HNS Convention];
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage,
art. 7, Mar. 23, 2001, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/
document/cm66/6693/6693.pdf [hereinafter Bunker Convention].
56. See MAR. TRANSP. COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REPORT
ON THE REMOVAL OF INSURANCE FROM SUBSTANDARD SHIPPING 1, 62 (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/15/32144381.pdf.
57. The predecessors are the 1924 and 1957 Conventions. These are still in
force for some states. A resolution by the 2001 IMO conference during the
adoption of the Bunker Convention urged the states to adopt the 1976
convention and its 1996 protocol so that a uniform liability for bunker oil
pollution can be maintained in all contracting states to the Bunker Convention.
See LING ZHU, COMPULSORY INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION FOR BUNKER OIL
POLLUTION DAMAGE 33, 45 (2007).
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tankers,58 and the maximum amount of compulsory insurance for
bunker oil pollution is set at the liability limit under the 1976
Liability Convention or its 1996 Protocol.59 Consequently, when
a country is a signatory to the Bunker Convention,60 ships
registered in that country are automatically required to carry
insurance up to the liability limit of the general maritime liability
conventions. Even when a ship is not registered in a contracting
state to the Bunker Convention but wants to enter the ports of a
contracting state, it has to carry such insurance.61
Since the claimants for bunker oil pollution and for other
maritime liabilities have to share the same liability fund,62 the
existence of compulsory insurance for bunker oil pollution also
ensures compensation for all other types of maritime liability.
Such liabilities include, inter alia, liability for cargo loss or
damage.63 As a result, compulsory insurance for bunker oil
pollution also guarantees compensation for cargo liability
claimants despite the fact that the conventions on cargo liability
do not require compulsory insurance.64 In short, the provision of

58. Oil pollution from the bunkers of tankers is already covered by the CLC.
The CLC defines “oil” as any “persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude
oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether carried on board a ship
as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.” CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 5
(emphasis added).
59. Bunker Convention, supra note 55, at art. 7.1. Insurance is required for
any ship over 1,000 grt.
60. The Bunker Convention entered into force on November 21, 2008. See
Bunker Convention, supra note 55.
61. See Bunker Converntion, supra note 55, at art. 7, para. 12; CLC, supra
note 1, at art. VII, para. 11. Like in the CLC, this provision also checks the
competitive advantage of a ship flying the flag of a non-contracting state over
the ships from contracting states. See ZHU, supra note 57, at 34.
62. This is because unlike the liability for oil pollution under the CLC or for
pollution under the HNS Convention, the Bunker Convention does not envisage
an exclusive fund for bunker oil pollution. Liability for bunker oil pollution is
treated equally with other liabilities of a ship-owner under general liability
conventions. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 9; HNS Convention, supra
note 55, at art. 12, para. 9. See also Chao Wu, Liability and Compensation for
Bunker Pollution, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 553, 564 (2002).
63. See Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, art. II,
Nov. 19, 1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 221; see also PATRICK GRIGGS ET AL., LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 134-36 (4th ed. 2005).
64. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155;
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compulsory insurance under the Bunker Convention indirectly
ensures the availability of insurance against almost all types of
maritime liabilities.
It can thus be said that compulsory
insurance has become a feature common to almost all types of
maritime liability.65 The HNS Convention, however, is not yet in
force66 so there is no compulsory insurance for liability arising
from an accident involving hazardous and noxious substances
except when such claims fall under the general maritime liability
law.
B. Direct Action against Insurers
The object of ensuring adequate compensation to oil pollution
victims is further strengthened by the provision of direct action
against the insurer of a liable ship-owner.67 This is a major
departure from traditional insurance policy under which a third
party may not bring an action against the insurer because
insurance is a contract between the insurer and the insured shipowner. Therefore, there is no privity of contract between the
insurer and a third party victim. This is especially the case in
indemnity insurance as opposed to mere liability insurance.68

Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 127;
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17
I.L.M. 806. The liability limit under the cargo conventions is further subject to
the overall limit under the 1976 Liability Convention as cargo claim is only one
of many possible property claims to be met from the general limitation fund set
up according to the 1976 Liability Convention.
65. However, claimants for non-bunker oil pollution may encounter
difficulties to obtain compensation despite compulsory insurance because they
would not be able to bring direct action against the insurer. See infra, text
accompanying discussion on direct action against insurers.
66. For the status of the HNS Convention, see Status of Conventions, INT’L
MAR. ORG., supra note 19. In order to expedite the ratification process by
removing some obstacles that stand in the way of ratification, a protocol to the
HNS Convention was adopted in April 2010. For an overview and the texts of
the HNS Convention and the 2010 Protocol, see The Convention, HNS
CONVENTION, http://www.hnsconvention.org/en/theconvention.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2011).
67. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8.
68. See STEVEN J. HAZELWOOD, P & I CLUBS LAW AND PRACTICE 141 (3d ed.
2000). See also West Wake Price & Co. v. Ching, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 45 at 49
(Eng.); Ali Galeb Ahmed et al. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n et
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Although the purpose of both liability and indemnity
insurance is the same—i.e., protection against the financial
burden of third party liability—indemnity insurance, particularly
the type provided by the ship-owners’ liability insurers
(Protection and Indemnity [P&I] clubs), is strictly based on a
“pay-to-be-paid” policy.69 An insured ship-owner has to first pay
out the victim in order to claim indemnification from the insurer.
The oil pollution liability regime has changed this practice by
affording the pollution victims the right to bring direct action
against insurers.70
Compulsory insurance would be of no use to a victim of oil
pollution if insurers could deny compensation to victims of oil
pollution by pleading policy defenses or exceptions against
insured ship-owners.71 Commensurate with its primary goal of
adequate compensation, the oil pollution liability regime prevents
insurers from invoking an insured’s breach of contractual
obligations, such as arguing failure to pay premium to deny
insurance benefits to victims of oil pollution. The CLC stipulates
that insurers cannot avail themselves of any defense against a
pollution victim which they could otherwise raise against the
insured.72
The only exception to the above rule is the defense of willful
misconduct of the insured;73 however, an insurer never has to pay
more than the liability limit under the CLC even when the
insured ship-owner would be unable to use its right to limit
liability due to certain conduct which may not necessarily amount
to willful misconduct.74
al., 640 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1981); Weeks v. Beryl Shipping Inc., 845 F.2d
304, 306 (11th Cir. 1988).
69. See GOTTHARD GAUCI, OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: CIVIL LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 221-24 (1997); see also TAN, supra note 11, at 42-43.
70. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8 (“Any claim for compensation
for pollution damage may be brought directly against the insurer or the person
providing financial security for the owner’s liability for pollution damage.”)
(emphasis added).
71. Røsæg, supra note 38, at 10.
72. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8.
73. Id.
74. Id. at art. V, para. 2. Willful misconduct appears to be different from
conduct barring limitation of liability. The latter conduct is ship-owner’s
“personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause [pollution]
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Again inspired by the success of the oil pollution liability
regime in providing adequate compensation, the IMO
incorporated the provision of direct action against the insurer
into other maritime liability conventions such as the HNS
Convention, the Athens Convention, and the Bunker
Convention.75 As discussed earlier, compulsory insurance has
incidentally become a feature of all maritime liability laws
through the Bunker Convention. This, however, cannot be said
with regard to direct action against insurers. When compulsory
insurance in the amount of the general liability fund exists
against combined liability for both bunker oil pollution and other
liability claims, only claimants for bunker oil pollution liability
can bring a direct action against the insurer.76 This is because
the basis of non-bunker oil pollution claims are in the general
liability conventions, which do not contain provisions allowing
direct action. The basis for bunker oil pollution liability is, of
course, the Bunker Convention with its provision on direct
insurance.
Direct action against an insurer as well as compulsory
insurance should be included in general liability conventions, if
adequate compensation is thought to be a desirable goal of other
maritime liability laws as well. Although adequate compensation

damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably
result.” Ship-owners’ personal acts or omissions to cause pollution damage do
not appear to be a defense for an insurer against a pollution victim’s claims. In
this respect, willful misconduct seems to be a more serious offense than a
personal act or omission with the intent to cause damage. Yet, for the purpose
of denying the right to limited liability, willful misconduct appears to be a lesser
fault than personal act or omission because the latter – and not the former –
deprives the ship-owner the right to limit liability. In practice and in their
ordinary meaning, they may be one and the same thing. In that case, there
seems to be some contradiction or oversight in article VII, paragraph 8 of the
CLC because one act is a defense and the other is not. Similar comments can be
made also with regard to “reckless conduct,” the other conduct barring the right
of limitation. However, if this conduct also amounts to willful misconduct,
victims of pollution would lose the right of direct action against insurers more
often than would be the case otherwise.
75. See HNS Convention, supra note 55, at art. 12, para. 8; 2002 Athens
Convention, supra note 53, at art. 5, para. 10; Bunker Convention, supra note
55, at art. 7, para. 10.
76. Bunker Convention, supra note 55, at art. 7, para. 10.
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per se should not be the goal of liability law,77 adequate
compensation through compulsory insurance and direct action
may enhance the deterrence purpose of liability law.78 Without
compulsory insurance and direct action, there is the possibility
that a ship-owner may escape its liability, which may in turn lead
the ship-owner to reduce its level of care.
Ship-owners and their liability insurers, the P&I clubs,79 are
naturally opposed to the inclusion of compulsory insurance and
direct action provisions in general maritime liability laws like the
1976 Liability Convention. They may argue that such provisions
are not feasible in non-oil pollution liability regimes because of
the diverse nature of cargo on non-tankers and the lack of
insurability for such cargo.
These arguments are tenuous
because ship-owners already have insurance against these types
of liability through their P&I clubs. There may not be any need
to change the present insurance arrangements at all. All that
would be needed is to make compulsory what ship-owners always
purchase voluntarily and then to secure the benefit of existing
insurance for liability claimants through direct action against the
insurer. As mentioned earlier, compulsory insurance forces shipowners, who try to escape liability through the “corporate veil,” to
buy insurance. Direct action, on the other hand, ensures that the
intended beneficiaries will in fact have access to the proceeds of
the compulsory insurance.

77. See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 9; see also SHAVELL, supra note
9, at 267-69, 635-38.
78. It is noteworthy here that compensation does not affect the goal of
deterrence if compensation is fully borne by the party who can cost-effectively
prevent or reduce oil pollution. On how to balance both deterrence and
compensation goals through liability law, see Michael J. Trebilcock, Incentive
Issues in the Design of ‘No-Fault’ Compensation System, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19
(1989).
79. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs are the mutual insurance
companies of ship-owners. Ship-owners are both the owners and customers of
the clubs. The thirteen largest clubs, covering more than ninety percent of the
world’s tonnage, formed the International Group of P&I Club. See INT’L GRP. OF
P&I CLUBS, http://www.igpandi.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
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C. Certificate of Insurance
Compulsory insurance and direct action against insurers may
fail to guarantee adequate compensation if ship-owners can avoid
verification by state authorities of insurance.
In order to
facilitate such verification, ship-owners are required to carry on
board proof of insurance in the form of an insurance certificate.80
A state party to the CLC can deny entry to a port or terminal
installation any ship without a certificate.81 Traditionally, a flag
state issues the various certificates a ship is required to carry.82
However, for insurance certification under the CLC, the flag state
must be a party to the CLC for its certification to be acceptable to
other CLC state parties.83
A ship from a non-CLC state wishing to trade in a state party
to the CLC has to obtain the certificate from a CLC state. This
provision has effectively checked the possibility of a certificate by
a flag state without properly verifying the existence of insurance
and the financial viability of the insurer. The provision also
indirectly induces states to become parties to the CLC so that
they can issue the certificate to their own ships in order to enable
them to trade with major oil-importing countries,84 most of whom
are parties to the CLC/Fund Convention regime with the notable
exception of the United States.85 In order to further ensure that
80. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 4.
81. Id. at art. VII, para. 10.
82. For example, under MARPOL 73, flag states are required to issue
certificates of compliance with regard to the conformity of a ship to construction
and design provisions. Similarly, it is also the duty of a flag state to issue
certificate confirming that the tank size of oil tankers conforms to the MARPOL
provisions. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 217(3),
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. UNCLOS requires
flag states to ensure the existence of necessary certificates on board their ships:
“States shall ensure that vessels flying their flag or of their registry carry on
board certificates required by and issued pursuant to international rules and
standards. . . . ” Id. at art. 217(3).
83. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 2.
84. The major oil importers are now the United States, Japan, China, Italy,
and South Korea. With the exception of the United States, the rest of the
countries are parties to the CLC. See About the IOPC Funds, INT’L OIL
POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, supra note 20 (under the heading “States Parties to
both the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention”).
85. However, in the United States, a similar certificate is also required under
the OPA. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006).
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insurance does not exist only on paper, a contracting state, when
in doubt about the financial capability of an insurer, can consult
with the certificate-issuing contracting state.86
D. Insurance through the IOPC Fund
The primacy of the goal of adequate compensation over that
of deterrence under the international oil pollution liability regime
is most obvious in its creation of the IOPC Fund.
As
contributions to this fund come exclusively from cargo owners –
i.e., the oil industry and not ship-owners – the question of
deterrence seems to be irrelevant. If oil pollution incidents arise
as a result of negligence, whether human or mechanical, it will be
almost without exception the negligence of ship-owners or their
employees.87 Despite the absence of any direct deterrence effects
from this provision, the creation of the IOPC Fund serves the oil
pollution liability regime’s stated purpose of adequate
compensation by providing for a second layer of insurance
protection against pollution damage.
As a second layer of insurance, the IOPC Fund provides
compensation only if a victim of oil pollution damage is unable to
obtain full compensation from ship-owners for one reason or
another despite the above insurance arrangements. The IOPC
Fund provides compensation when compensation from the owner
of the involved ship is either unavailable88 or inadequate.89 The
first scenario may occur in the unlikely event that both a ship86. CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 7.
87. Although it is true that a shipping incident involving oil as cargo may
cause more damage to third parties and the environment than shipping
incidents involving non-oil cargo, there is no logic in putting the blame on
owners of the cargo (i.e., oil companies) since damage such as this will not
improve deterrence. Despite this, during the negotiations of the CLC and the
Fund Conventions, some delegates argued to impose liability on cargo owners.
For example, according to the Danish delegate in the 1969 conference,
“Maritime transport was not dangerous in itself: it was only dangerous if the
goods carried were dangerous and it was therefore normal to impose liability on
the cargo for any damage caused to a third party. The industry which made a
profit from that business should also accept the risks entailed.” INT’L MAR. ORG.,
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONFERENCE ON MARINE POLLUTION
DAMAGE 1969, 628 (1973). See also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 172.
88. IOPC Funds, supra note 36, at art. 4(1)(b).
89. Id. at art. 4(1)(c).
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owner and its liability insurer go bankrupt.90 The second and
more likely scenario arises where the ship-owner has limited
liability. In fact, most cases involving compensation from the
IOPC Fund in the past arose due to the inadequacy of shipowners’ liability limit.91
The contributions to support the IOPC Fund come
collectively from cargo interests, meaning the oil companies who
receive oil via the sea from contracting states to the Fund
Convention.92 The contribution mechanisms of the oil-receiving
companies to the Fund are comparable to the premium paid by
ship-owners to their mutual protection and indemnity insurance
(P&I) clubs. In both cases the total contribution is calculated on
the basis of the Fund’s or the P&I club’s annual oil pollution
liability payouts to pollution victims. The only difference is that
while the P&I clubs take into account the claim history and/or
care level of each ship-owner for the calculation of that individual
ship-owner’s contribution, the IOPC Fund does not and cannot
consider these factors in determining the levies it imposes on
each contributing oil company.93 The single factor for purposes of
calculating the contributions of an individual oil company is the
amount of its total oil-receipt via sea transport.94 Like the

90. This may also occur if a tanker does not have insurance at all because
insurance is not compulsory for tankers of 2,000 grt or below.
91. See Thomas Mensah, The IOPC Funds: how it all started, in THE IOPC
FUNDS’ 25 YEARS OF COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF OIL POLLUTION INCIDENTS 48
(2003); see also TAN, supra note 11, at 305-06.
92. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10.
93. This is simply because there is hardly anything an oil company can do to
reduce accidental oil spills from ships except that the company may take some
care to choose seaworthy ships for the carriage of its cargo.
94. There were suggestions for imposing differentiated levies on oil
companies based on the pollution incidents from the carriage of each company’s
oil. The justification of this suggestion is that such differentiation would force
the oil companies to charter ships of best quality and to avoid chartering substandard ships as a means of cutting the cost of chartering at the expense of
safety. See TAN, supra note 11, at 342-43. The benefit of such mechanisms
would be indirect whereas inducing ship-owners to properly maintain their
ships would be direct and thereby more efficient. For comments on similar
suggestions about the identical contribution formula to oil industry’s private
agreement, see Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement of Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution, Jan. 14, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 137, 137 (1971); see also M’GONIGLE &
ZACHER, supra note 3, at 182.
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advance and supplementary “calls” (premium) charged by the
P&I clubs,95 the IOPC Fund also levies the oil companies based
on the anticipated liability first and on the actual liability later.96
Technically, there may be credit back to the contributors if the
actual liability is less than the anticipated amount. However,
this situation is rare.97
Although the creation of the IOPC Fund is a praiseworthy
innovation in terms of providing adequate compensation, its
presence may reduce the deterrence effect of ship-owners’ liability
to the extent the Fund pays for oil pollution damage caused by
the negligence of ship-owners. This argument is not really
against the Fund’s role to provide adequate compensation but
against its role to partially absorb a negligent ship-owner’s
liability. However, there are many situations under the Fund
Convention where the IOPC Fund pays compensation and there
is no question of ship-owners’ negligence.98 These situations
include natural disaster,99 action of a third party, or negligence of
the government authority in charge of maintaining lights and
navigational aids.100 In the latter two situations, the Fund may

95. HAZELWOOD, supra note 68, at 122.
96. See SECRETARIAT, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXPLANATORY NOTE 4-5
(Sept. 2011), available at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf [hereinafter
Explanatory note of IOPC Fund]. See also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at
192.
97. In the 1992 IOPC Fund, in the year 2000 alone, £3.7 million was credited
back to the contributors from the unused contributions of 1999. See Explanatory
note of IOPC Fund, supra note 96, at 4-5.
98. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 1(a).
99. This situation is expressly mentioned in the CLC as an exonerating factor
for ship-owner’s liability. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. III, para. 2(a). Its
absence among exonerating factors in the Fund Convention is deliberate as
article 4(4)(b) of the Fund Convention stipulates the conditions for the Fund to
pay compensation in such situation. See Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art.
4, para. 4(b).
100. Again, the liability of the Fund in these two situations is implied since
they are not mentioned among the exonerating situations. This is also clear
from the negotiations of the parties at the 1971 Conference, where some states
(including Canada and the United States) demanded that the Fund should cover
all cases of oil pollution damage not covered by the CLC. However, as a
compromise, the Fund is exonerated from any liability for oil pollution from
unknown sources (mysterious spills) or when the cause of the damage is war or
war-like situation. See M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 184-85.
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claim reimbursement from the third party and the government
under the principle of subrogation.101
Payment by the Fund for oil pollution damage caused solely
by natural disasters reinforces the fact that the primary goal of
the oil pollution liability regime is the provision of adequate
compensation as opposed to the creation of deterrence from
negligence.102
However, providing adequate compensation
through the IOPC Fund in the above three situations does not
affect the deterrent effect of the liability law because no optimal
precautionary steps taken by ship-owners could prevent pollution
Consequently, there can be no
damage in those cases.103
objection to the Fund’s role in providing compensation where
ship-owners’ negligence has no causal connection with an incident
of oil pollution damage. In these cases, the Fund functions solely
as an insurer for pollution victims and not for negligent shipowners.
The justification for compensation from the Fund in cases of
natural disaster lies in the social benefit of internalizing the cost
of “externalities” arising from oil pollution.104 Oil pollution
damage suffered by people not involved in the transportation
contract is an external social cost (i.e., an externality) flowing
from the transportation of oil.105 If neither ship-owners nor oil
companies bear this cost, the price of oil to consumers would not
reflect this externality. Consequently, the market price of oil
would be less than its real social cost and there would be
excessive consumption of oil. This means that some people whose

101. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 9, para. 2.
102. It is noteworthy here that the maximum liability limit of the Fund
applies to per natural disaster regardless of the number of shipping incidents
caused by the same natural disaster. See Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art.
4, para. 4(a), (b); see also M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 185.
103. The deterrence effect of liability is compromised when a potentially liable
person who can take care to prevent or reduce the loss does not have to pay for
full liability because other parties such as the IOPC Fund foot the bill.
104. For the definition of “externality,” see Ralph C. d’Arge & Emery K. Hunt,
Environmental Pollution, Externalities, and Conventional Economic Wisdom: A
Critique, 1 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 266, 266-67 (1972); see also ARTHUR C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932) (the classic work on
externalities).
105. MITCHELL, supra note 50, at 74-75.
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benefits from consumption of oil are less than the consumed oil’s
real social costs would buy oil.
On the other hand, if oil companies pay for this kind of oil
pollution damage through the IOPC Fund, the price of oil will
reflect its real social cost; and those consumers whose utility from
consumption of oil is below this cost will not consume this
valuable limited resource.106 In other words, the cost of oil
pollution externalities will thus be internalized. Internalization of
externalities leads to optimal resource allocation and prevents
social waste. This also indirectly reduces the incidents of oil
pollution to the extent the incidents of oil pollution are causally
correlated to the amount of oil transported via sea because
reduced consumption will naturally reduce the amount of oil
transported via sea. As a result, imposing levies on oil companies
for oil pollution damage from ships due to natural elements of the
sea makes economic sense.
The innovative insurance arrangement through the IOPC
Fund has greatly contributed to the success of the oil pollution
liability regime in providing adequate compensation. Although
provisions have been made for a similar fund under the HNS
Convention,107 one of the important elements of an insurance pool
is rather weak in the case of the HNS Fund; that is, a large pool
of similar insured risks. Unlike oil, the hazardous and noxious
substances covered under the HNS Convention and carried via
sea are diverse in nature and pose dissimilar risks. The number
of such substances is likely to exceed 6,000 and they are carried
in different vessel types and sizes.108 This would be the main
obstacle to the provision of a second tier of insurance through the
HNS Fund, when the HNS Convention comes into force.
Contributors of the HNS Fund would be the various chemical
companies.109

106. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 70-72.
107. See HNS Convention, supra note 55, at art. 9, para. 1(a)(ii), art. 14, para.
5(a)—(b). The HNS Fund would cover damages up to SDR250 million including
SDR100 million from ship-owners.
108. TAN, supra note 11, at 335-36.
109. See generally id. at 334-56.
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E. Insurance through the Supplementary Fund
The goal of adequate compensation for oil pollution damage
has been greatly achieved by the creation of a new
Supplementary Fund in 2003, culminating from a succession of
initiatives following the Erika incident off the coast of Brittany,
France, in 1999.110 As mentioned earlier, the Supplementary
Fund would provide up to SDR750 million (US$1.18 billion) for a
single oil pollution incident on the waters of a contracting
state.111 The Supplementary Fund functions as a third tier of
insurance against oil pollution damage.112 It kicks in when the
liability limit of the IOPC Fund is exhausted in providing
compensation for oil pollution damage. With the exception of the
higher compensation ceiling, the Supplementary Fund’s scope of
application and compensation procedures is similar to those of
the IOPC Fund. As a result, all the above discussion related to
the IOPC Fund’s effect on deterrence from negligent navigation
applies equally to the Supplementary Fund.
The contribution mechanism of the Supplementary Fund is
also similar to that of the IOPC Fund: its contributions come from
the oil companies in the contracting states to the Supplementary
Fund Protocol. Like the IOPC Fund, the Supplementary Fund
levies those oil companies that receive over 150,000 tons of oil via
the sea from the contracting States.113 One important difference
between the two funds is that each contracting state to the
Supplementary Fund has to make a minimum contribution
110. The ship broke into two with 31,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. It spilled
19,800 tons of oil. As of October 2010, a total of 7,131 claims had been made,
and the total amount claimed reached as high as €388.9 million, of which 5,939
were admitted and €129.7 million paid for. The remaining 1,016 claims were
rejected. See Incidents, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http://
www.iopcfund.org/erika.htm (last updated May 9, 2011) (discussing Erika).
111. See Supplementary Fund Protocol, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
This amount is, however, in combination with SDR230 million from the IOPC
Fund and SDR89.77 million from ship-owners.
112. Even though no incident requiring compensation from the Supplementary
Fund has yet occurred since its coming into existence on March 3, 2005, the
contracting states or the oil companies in those states have been levied
£0.0017223 per ton of contributing oil on March 1, 2007 for meeting the
Supplementary Fund’s administrative expenses. See Explanatory note of IOPC
Fund, supra note 96, at 5-6.
113. Supplementary Fund Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 10.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2

26

68

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

regardless of whether any company in the state receives over
150,000 tons of oil. This minimum contribution is based on a
presumed receipt of one million tons of contributing oil, if the
total oil receipt in the state falls below the one million ton
threshold.114 The responsibility to pay for any amount falling
short of the threshold limit lies with the contracting state’s
government,115 as opposed to the oil companies in it. The purpose
of this provision is to ensure that each contracting state bears
some of the costs of the Supplementary Fund’s total yearly
expenses.116
The
compulsory
minimum
payment
makes
the
Supplementary Fund resemble a mutual insurance fund more
than a pure compensation fund. Like any insurance pool where
each insured has to pay a premium in order to obtain insurance
protection, each contracting state to the Supplementary Fund
Protocol has to contribute something in order to benefit from this
third layer of insurance protection. On the other hand, a
contracting state to the Fund Convention can receive
compensation from the IOPC Fund without making any
contribution to the fund if no oil company in that state receives
over 150,000 tons of oil in a fiscal year.117 For example, twentyfive states out of one 104 state parties to the Fund Convention in
2009 did not have to pay any contribution to the IOPC Fund since
no oil companies in those countries received oil over the minimum
threshold.118 The non-contributing states are usually developing
states with small economies. Lack of contribution, however, does
not affect their eligibility to seek compensation from the IOPC
Fund. The IOPC Fund’s formula is a laudable approach to the

114. Id. at art. 14, para. 1.
115. Id. at art. 14, para. 2.
116. THIRD INTERSESSIONAL WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE SECOND AND THIRD
MEETINGS OF THE THIRD INTERSESSIONAL WORKING GROUP OF THE 1992 FUND 1920, available at http://documentservices.iopcfund.org/meeting-documents/searchresults/?query=92FUND%2FWGR.3%2F9&titles-only=0&titles-only=1&fundsession=fund-2&session_number=&working_group_number=&agenda_item=
&start-year=1978&end-year=2011 (follow “92 FUND/WGR3/9” hyperlink).
117. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10, para. 1.
118. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2010: INTERNATIONAL
OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND 19 (2010), available at http://
www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR2010e.pdf.
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goal of adequate compensation for oil pollution damage, as well as
to the protection of the marine environment.119
From an environmental point of view, the Supplementary
Fund’s contribution and compensation formulae are regrettable.
An oil spill incident may cause as much damage to a developing
country as to a developed one and may require as much
compensation for both clean-up costs and monetary damage
arising from oil pollution.
Despite this equal need for
compensation, the burden of minimum compulsory contribution
on the developing states would be unequally heavy. Fear of this
burden discourages them from becoming parties to the
Supplementary Fund Protocol.120
Developing states usually receive less oil and via smaller
tankers. Thus, they may be exposed to fewer, if any, devastating
oil pollution incidents, an observation supported by the history of
the most disastrous oil pollution accidents.121 This observation,
however, actually provides additional support for requiring
minimum compulsory contributions to the Supplementary Fund
from developing countries, as they would hardly require
compensation from the Supplementary Fund. Yet, this does not
completely obviate their need for assurance of compensation from
the Supplementary Fund for a random extraordinarily large
incident exceeding the limit of the IOPC Fund. Following such a
spill, clean-up operations and adequate compensation should not
be affected by a state’s financial ability to contribute to the
Supplementary Fund.
In addition, oil pollution incidents in some developing
countries may occur due to the transport of oil to the developed

119. It is noteworthy here that oil pollution compensation covers not only the
losses suffered by individual victims but also expenses for preventive measures
taken by private individuals or public authorities to reduce or eliminate
environmental damage from an oil spill. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. I, para. 6
(defining “pollution damage”). In fact, most of the compensation payouts are
made against the latter type of damage.
120. One factor for the widespread acceptance of the Fund Convention is that
the governments of the contracting states do not have to contribute any money
to the IOPC Fund. The burden only falls on the oil companies in the state
parties. See TAN, supra note 11, at 332-33.
121. Deepwater Horizon, Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez, Erika,
Nakahodka and Prestige all occurred on the waters of developed countries.
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world en route through the developing countries’ waters. For
example, oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe,
Japan, and the U.S. touch the waters of many African and Asian
countries.122 Yet, if a serious oil pollution incident occurs in those
countries, compensation will not be forthcoming from the
Supplementary Fund because these countries are not parties to
the Supplementary Fund Protocol, having been discouraged by its
compulsory minimum contribution.
F. Insurance from national oil pollution funds
Although the question of adequate compensation may seem to
be fully addressed by the creation of the Supplementary Fund,
the international oil pollution liability regime neither recognizes
all types of ‘oil’ nor covers all pollution from the recognized types
of oil. Compensation under the international regime is limited to
pollution damage from “persistent oil.”123 Even if the pollution
arises from persistent oil but the source of pollution is unknown
or is not a ship, neither the ship-owners nor the two funds will
provide compensation.124 In addition, there are only twentyseven state parties to the Supplementary Fund compared to 105

122. M’GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 3, at 185, 233.
123. The CLC defines “oil” as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as
crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether carried on board a
ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.” CLC, supra note 1, at art. I,
para. 5 (emphasis added). The same definition is included in the Fund
Convention by reference. Fund Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 2.
Canada’s proposal to define the word “oil” broadly under the Fund Convention
in order to include “liquid hydrocarbon of any kind” was opposed by the oil
industry and many oil-importing countries on the ground, inter alia, that such a
wide definition would cause the involvement of the IOPC Fund in a large
number of minor oil spill cases. See INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MAR. CONSULTATIVE
ORG., OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION FUND FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1971 320-21
(1978) [hereinafter Official Records of the 1971 Fund Conference].
124. An American proposal to require the IOPC Fund to pay compensation for
“mysterious” spills was also rejected by the oil industry and some states on the
same ground that it would necessitate frequent involvement of the Fund for
many small spills. Yet, the Scandinavian proposal to limit the Fund’s
contribution only to cases of oil pollution damage exceeding 15 million francs
(US$1 million) was not accepted by the oil industry. Official Records of the 1971
Fund Conference, supra note 123, at 355-65, 384-88; M’GONIGLE & ZACHER,
supra note 3, at 185-89, n. 78.
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parties to the Fund Convention.125 As a result, there is always
the likelihood that either an oil pollution incident will not fall
under the international oil pollution liability regime126 or oil
pollution in non-state parties to the Supplementary Fund will
exceed the IOPC Fund’s limit.
The goal of adequate compensation, however, requires that
these gaps in the international oil pollution liability regime be
filled by national compensation funds, another layer of insurance
against oil pollution damage. Canada responded to this need
through the creation of the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund
(SOPF).127 The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) in the
U.S. also serves a similar function. The SOPF covers any oil
pollution damage not covered by the international liability law
regime for any of the above reasons; however, it heavily
subsidizes ship-owners at the expense of oil companies, who are
the main contributors to the SOPF.128 In many cases, there is no
connection between the contributors and the beneficiaries of the
SOPF in Canadian domestic oil pollution cases. Most of the oil
pollution cases compensated by the SOPF arose from the bunker
of non-tankers,129 while the contributions to the SOPF mainly
come from oil companies. The solution seems to be to require all
vessels, tankers and non-tankers, small or large, to carry
compulsory insurance against oil pollution.

125. See About the IOPC Fund, INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, supra note
20.
126. As indicated, although the Deepwater Horizon would be considered a
vessel under the OPA, this would not be so under the international oil pollution
liability regime. See supra note 29. Thus, even if the U.S. were a party to the
international liability regime, no compensation would come from any of the
international funds.
127. See THE SHIP-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION FUND, ADM’R’S ANNUAL REPORT 20052006
37
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ssopfund.gc.ca/documents/
2006ShipSourceAR_e.pdf [hereinafter SOPF ANNUAL REPORT].
128. Id. at 3-5.
129. This is evidenced from the fact that most of the 47 incidents reported in
the SOPF ANNUAL REPORT were not from oil tankers (ships carrying oil as cargo),
indicating bunkers as the source of spilled oil. See id. at 7-29. This was one of
the reasons the oil industry rejected the proposal to provide compensation in
cases of oil spills from unknown sources in the 1971 IMO conference. See Official
Records of the 1971 Fund Conference, supra note 123, at 320-21.
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III. DECREASE OF ACCIDENTAL OIL SPILLS AND
INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
A. Reduced oil pollution incidents
Empirical evidence shows that the incidents of accidental oil
spills from tankers are steadily decreasing.130 A survey of oil spill
incidents in Canada shows that between 1993 and 2006 only 7.5
percent of the total spills were from tankers, while 75.5 percent
were from non-tanker and 17 percent from unknown ships or
other sources (“mysterious spills”).131 This trend can also be
observed worldwide. The world saw a dramatic decrease in the
number of oil spill accidents from tankers in the last forty-one
years.132 For large spills of over 700 tons from 1970-1979, there
were more than twenty-five spills on average per year. The
number of such spills declined to an average of 9.3 per year
during 1980-1989, 7.8 per year in the period of 1990-1999, and
only 3.3 spills per year over the period of 2000-2010.133
In addition to reduction in number, the size of the spills has
also gradually decreased. The majority of oil spills from 1970 to
2010 were below seven tons, with most of the large spills
occurring in the earlier years.134 Logically, the amount of total
spilled oil per year is also on the decline from 1980 onward except
in a few random years when one or two large spills made the total
quantity exceed the average by a large amount.135
This
130. It is noteworthy here that oil pollution liability law addresses the
problem of accidental as opposed to operational oil pollution.
131. See SOPF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 127, at 37.
INT’L
TANKER
OWNERS
POLLUTION
FED’N,
132. See
Statistics,
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/statistics/
index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); See also KEISHA HUIJER, INT’L TANKER
OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, TRENDS IN OIL SPILLS FROM TANKER SHIPS 1995-2004
(2005), available at http://www.itopf.com/assets/documents/ amop05.pdf.
133. See Statistics, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N, supra note 132.
134. See id. As the oil spill from Deepwater Horizon is not from an oil tanker
or a conventional ship, the statistics in the ITOPF’s website do not include this
incident among the major oil spills.
135. See id. As for similar progress in the United States, see generally Joint
Hearing on Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard &
Mar. Transp. and Water Res. & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. &
Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 12 (1999) (statement of James Loy, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard).
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downward trend in the incidents of oil spills is the result of a
combination of many factors including the above-mentioned
insurance arrangements. Other factors, which are not discussed
in this article, include strict liability for oil pollution damage,
higher liability limit, and some non-liability legal aspects such as
improved tanker design and strong port state control.136
B. Role of insurance in the decrease of oil pollution
incidents
Although this article mainly highlights the role of insurance
in providing adequate compensation in the above discussion,
innovative insurance arrangements in the oil pollution liability
regime has also incidentally improved the deterrence aspect of
the liability law; increasing deterrence in turn contributes to the
reduction of oil pollution incidents.
As this article has
occasionally alluded to the latter role of insurance when
discussing the justifications of the various insurance
arrangements, the discussion here will be brief.
First, compulsory insurance prevents a negligent ship-owner
from escaping liability by keeping its corporate assets low
through forming a “one-ship” company.137 This is because there
will always be proceeds from compulsory insurance after an
accident regardless of the value of the ship or its corporate status.
This increases the probability of actual liability on ship-owners.
As a result, their expected liability will now be higher than
before, reflected in the insurance premium ship-owners pay.138

136. For a discussion on the effect of these factors on the reduction of oil
pollution incidents, see generally Muhammad Masum Billah, Effects of
Insurance’s Absence or Presence on Maritime Liability Law with Special
Reference to Cargo Liability and Oil Pollution Liability Regimes: An Economic
Analysis 222-38 (2009) (unpublished LL.D thesis, Univ. of Ottawa) (on file with
author).
137. See supra text accompanying note 47 (example of the widespread practice
among ship-owners of forming “one-ship” corporations).
138. For example, if oil pollution causes on average $1,000 worth of damage
per incident and the probability of liability (compensation) is 100 percent (i.e.,
liability is certain), the average expected liability of a ship-owner is $1,000
($1,000 x 100%). On the other hand, if the probability is lower, like 50 percent,
the expected liability per incident would be $500 ($1,000 x 50%). The premium
for liability insurance is mainly based on this expected liability. Higher
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Higher expected liability or increased insurance premiums will
make the expenditure on optimal care more cost-efficient.139 In
other words, in some cases where the cost of optimal care seemed
higher to an insured than the expected liability in the past
because of the possibility of escaping liability through the
“corporate veil,” this cost may now appear to be lower than the
cost of care. Consequently, a rational ship-owner will be induced
to take optimal care.140
Second, direct action against insurers makes the probability
of actual liability even higher than would be the case without the
provision of direct action even when insurance is compulsory.
There are two explanations for this: first, despite compulsory
insurance, an insured may be bankrupt and the insurer could
simultaneously deny the liability judgment on grounds of lack of
privity of contract between the insurer and the liability claimant;
second, the insurer may plead some policy defenses or exceptions
(e.g., non-payment of premium) against the insured and
consequently against the claimant. The provisions of direct
action against insurers under the oil pollution liability regime
eliminated both these possibilities.141
As insurers will be exposed to more frequent payouts to the
victims of oil pollution in cases of negligence by the insured shipowner, insurers will charge higher premiums on negligent shipowners. Increased premiums will in turn induce the insured to
expected liability would require a higher premium, while lower expected liability
will reduce the premium. See Billah, supra note 10, at 310.
139. Using the example from the previous note, when the expected liability is
$500 due to the low probability of liability, a ship-owner may not want to spend
more than $500 on care. On the other hand, when the liability is certain (100
percent probability) and the expected liability is $1,000, a ship-owner would not
hesitate to spend up to $1,000 on care in order not to be held liable. Whenever
the cost of care is less than the damage it prevents, care is cost-efficient or
optimal.
140. Cost of optimal care can never be more than the expected liability
because optimal care, by definition, is care that costs less than the probabilitydiscounted or expected liability. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055, 1056-57 (1972). However,
cost of optimal care might appear higher because of the lower probability of
being held liable due to a liable party’s ability to escape from paying for liability
judgment. See SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 230-32, 387-91.
141. See CLC, supra note 1, at art. VII, para. 8. See also discussion supra Part
I.B.
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reduce their insurer’s exposure to oil pollution claims.142 The
only way the insured can do this is through improving their
standard of care so that the number of oil pollution incidents
decreases from the existing level. The dramatic reduction in oil
pollution accidents may be at least partly due to this indirect
incentive towards care, emanating from the provision of direct
action in the oil pollution liability regime.
The direct action provision also motivates insurers to be
extra vigilant against the negligent conducts of their insured
ship-owners. Insurers have various tools such as premium rate
variance, deductibles, policy limit, and even outright denial of
coverage to check the carelessness of insured ship-owners.143
Since insurers use these tools even when there is no provision for
direct action against them, they now have an added incentive to
use them more frequently. The end result is increased pressure
on the owners of substandard ships to take optimal care.
Lastly, even though the second and third tier of insurance
through the IOPC and Supplementary Funds are mainly
designed for adequate compensation and are funded by the oil
industry and not by ship-owners, these arrangements indirectly
put pressure on ship-owners to be more diligent in the operation
of their ships. This is because oil companies, who are the main
contributors to both funds, are also the main, if not sole,
customers of the oil-carrying ships (tankers). Given that the
operation of these ships has a direct effect on the ultimate
contributions that oil companies make to the Funds, oil
companies as a group are naturally opposed to and united against
substandard shipping. This opposition translates into various
initiatives to motivate ship-owners toward optimal care. One
such initiative is a database maintained by the oil industry on
substandard ships, known as the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE)
142. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE,
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986).
143. See generally Muhammad Masum Billah, Incentive Effect of Liability
Rules in the Presence of Liability Insurance in the Maritime Law Context: An
Economic Analysis, 31 DALHOUSIE L. J. 427 (2008). These mechanisms make the
insured as “co-insured” or “self-insured” by making the insured bear at least
partial risk of the loss or liability. For more on insurance policies and risk
allocation, see KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 14143 (1974).
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Program.144 The database contains inspection reports on many
oil-carrying ships.
Another initiative, which is more direct, is to demand
indemnification from ship-owners for compensation paid out of
the IOPC and Supplementary Funds, especially in cases of
liability for small ships where the Funds are more likely to bear
the disproportionate burden of oil pollution compensation.145 In
this regard, after the creation of the Supplementary Fund, two
voluntary agreements146 were reached between oil companies and
ship-owners through their International Group of P&I clubs,
whereby ship-owners agreed to indemnify the IOPC and
Supplementary Funds for oil pollution arising from small ships or
oil pollution requiring contribution from the Supplementary
Fund. Again, the increased burden of liability on ship-owners
through these insurance arrangements leads to more deterrence
and, consequently, a reduction in oil pollution incidents.
The last point proves a much repeated principle in economic
analysis of liability law, known as the Coase Theorem.147
According to the Theorem, if there is little to no transaction
(negotiation) cost, optimal care (i.e., efficient allocation of
resources to bring such care) will be undertaken by the party who
can take such care regardless of which side bears the initial

144. See SIRE Introduction, OIL COMPANIES INT’L MARINE FORUM (OCIMF),
http://www.ocimf.com/SIRE/introduction (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
145. This is because the liability of a ship-owner depends on the tonnage of the
ship. So, the maximum liability of small ships may be less than the actual
damage they cause, thus requiring more frequent involvement of the IOPC and
the Supplementary Funds to pay for the unpaid compensation. See Tan , supra
note 11, at 332.
146. They are the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement
(STOPIA) 2006 and the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement
(TOPIA) 2006. These agreements have been in operation since February 20,
2006. Under STOPIA, the International Group of P&I clubs (the Group) will
bear up to SDR20 million of liability for oil pollution from any ship with total
tonnage of 29,584 or less in the contracting states to the Fund Convention. This
is despite the lower limit of ship-owners’ liability under the CLC. Under TOPIA,
the Group will indemnify the Supplementary Fund for 50 percent of the
payment for oil pollution arising from any ship covered by the Group. See
Explanatory note of IOPC Fund, supra note 96, at 6.
147. See generally Ronald Coase, The problem of social cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
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liability.148 Although a transaction with zero cost may never
exist in the real world, transaction costs would be minimal and
the parties could allocate their resources optimally where the
parties can easily bargain and “are of approximately equal size,
number, expertise, and wealth.”149 In the context of oil pollution
liability, such transactions do exist between ship-owners and oil
companies due to their equal bargaining power and mutual
dependence on each other. As a result, even though the initial
burden of additional oil pollution compensation through the IOPC
Fund and the Supplementary Fund falls on oil companies, the
negotiation between the organizations representing ship-owners
and oil companies ultimately leads to the optimal allocation of
resources to reduce oil pollution incidents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The international oil pollution liability law regime is one of
the best examples of how proper insurance arrangements can
guarantee the success of liability law in providing adequate
compensation and deterring liable parties from negligent
behavior.
However, its excessive focus on compensation
sometimes ignores the most important goal of liability law:
deterrence. Providing compensation from various funds not
contributed to by liable ship-owners does not promote the goal of
deterrence. Luckily, this has not led to an increase in oil
pollution incidents because the oil industry puts indirect pressure
on ship-owners to provide well-maintained ships. Accidental oil
pollution incidents from ships are on the decline. This is brought

148. The theorem is usually discussed in the context of two parties without
any prior contractual relationship, where the action of one side causes harm to
the other (e.g., the action of a rancher raising cattle causes harm to the crops of
a neighboring farmer). Although there are contractual relationships between
individual ship-owners and individual oil companies to transport oil, no such
contract exists between these two groups. The action of the former as a group
(i.e., negligent navigation) causes harm to the latter group (i.e., increased
contribution to the IOPC and Supplement Funds to pay for pollution damage).
See id. at 2-5.
149. CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 172.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/2
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about by a multitude of factors; among these factors, innovative
insurance arrangements are very important. 150
Despite the positive observations above, some aspects of the
international oil pollution liability regime need improvement.
The scope of its application is very narrow compared to the OPA.
Since the international regime covers only pollution damage from
oil tankers or ships which are adapted to carry oil as cargo and
are actually carrying oil at the time of an oil spill, it would not
cover the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill—the world’s largest
oil spill incident—even if the U.S. were a party to it. This is
regrettable because oil companies will always be the source of
these types of oil spills, and they finance both the IOPC and
Supplementary Funds in the international regime. Furthermore,
the definitions of “oil” and “ship” are broader in U.S. law than in
the international regime. Lastly, the mandatory minimum
contribution to the Supplementary Fund stands in the way of the
ratification of the Supplementary Fund Protocol by many
developing states. Where devastating oil pollution incidents
occur in non-state parties to the Supplementary Fund Protocol,
this affects both the international oil pollution regime’s primary
goal of adequate compensation as well as clean-up measures in
affected marine environments.

150. Among the other factors are strict liability for oil pollution, higher
liability limit, improved tanker designs (e.g., double-hull) and strong
enforcement of oil pollution regulations by port states. See Billah, supra note
136, at 222-38.
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